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ABSTRACT 
GHOSTNet is a secure and anonymous Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) service. Coupling Ethernet tunneling and proxy 
services to provide users safe and anonymous Internet 
access, GHOSTNet utilizes TLS (SSL) protocol with AES-256 
encryption to secure the network along with PKI certificates 
and HMAC protection from replay attacks and UDP flooding.  
This thesis will be a system level test and evaluation 
of the GHOSTNet infrastructure. The primary objective is to 
determine the functional performance of GHOSTNet as a global 
command and control gateway with the goal of being able to 
dynamically connect and disconnect diverse forces on a task-
force-by-task-force basis. To accomplish this objective, a 
robust test and evaluation plan will be implemented to base 
line the system in the moderate operating conditions of 
COASTS field experiments conducted at Camp Roberts. The 
system will then be tested in various operation environments 
to include, but not limited to, Fort Ord, the U.S. Cost 
Guard Station Monterey Bay, and Southern Thailand as part of 
the COASTS field experimentation program spanning FY 2008 
and FY2009. 
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The speed, flexibility, agility and scalability of 
maritime forces provide joint or combined force commanders a 
range of options for responding to crises.  Additionally, 
the integrated maritime operations, either within formal 
alliance structures (such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization) or more informal arrangements (such as the 
Global Maritime Partnership initiative), send powerful 
messages to would-be aggressors that the U.S. will act with 
others to ensure collective security and prosperity.1 
This overwhelming task of providing global stability to 
promote worldwide economic commerce has specific tenants 
that will rely primarily on the exchange of information over 
tactical computer networks.  The ultimate objective is to 
deliver timely intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) necessary to achieve situational 
awareness by tactical and strategic decision makers 
throughout the chain of command and laterally among 
multinational partners and regional military and law 
enforcement through information sharing. Virtual Private 
Networking (VPN) is a relatively new technology currently 
utilized by the Department of Navy (DoN) for transmitting 
sensitive data across an unsecured network. Specifically, 
the Navy has looked at the Non-classified Internet Protocol 
Routing Network (NIPRNET) and methods of communicating 
                     
1 Chief of Naval Operations, “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower,” 17 October 2007, available from www.navy.mil/maritime, 
(accessed 05 January 2009). 
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Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU) data across the public 
Internet medium or across unsecured networks.  Additionally, 
the Navy will be looking to provide the separation of data 
for different communities of interest (CIO) within the 
Secured Internet Protocol Routing Network (SIPRNET).2   
 The most critical aspect of this objective is 
providing the security of data for SBU information exchanged 
between multinational and DoD assets. The network 
infrastructure is only as good as its ability to provide 
security for users and information.  The rapid advancements 
in network components, secure communications, and mobile 
data devices have made possible the practical use of 
networks in many current military and law enforcement 
applications in a variety of environments.      
B. VISION 
Envision a command cell in Norfolk, Virginia, watching 
a live video feed from a boarding in support of Maritime 
Interdiction Operation (MIO) taking place in the Port Fifth 
Fleet Operating Area (AOR). Key decision makers and 
intelligence analysts could see and hear the live 
interaction between boarding team members and the vessel’s 
personnel, biometric data from the vessel’s personnel could 
be instantly sent from a laptop, deployed with the team 
onboard the vessel, to a biometric database in Virginia for 
documentation and comparison against known or suspected 
terrorists.  While the comparison of biometric data was 
being conducted boarding team members could transmit images 
                     
2 Department of the Navy, “Naval Virtual Private Network Product 
Requirements,” 2000, 1. 
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of contraband, significant documents or intelligence, and 
observations made during the conduct of the boarding, in 
real time, without ever leaving the vessel’s pilot house.    
C. APPLICATION 
Maritime forces will be employed to build confidence 
and trust among nations through collective security efforts 
that focus on common threats and mutual interests in an 
open, multi-polar world. To do so will require an 
unprecedented level of integration among our maritime forces 
and enhanced cooperation with the other instruments of 
national power, as well as the capabilities of our 
international partners.3 
GHOSTNet is a cypto-analytically secure network system 
that has the availability to be worldwide to connect 
computer equipment as though they were on a single local 
area network.4 GHOSTNet establishes secure communications 
and anonymous Internet access between multiple remote 
network clients via Ethernet tunneling, providing client to 
client communications. GHOSTNet assumes that all 
communication channels are unsecure and employs end-to-end 
encryption to achieve operation security. The modular 
encryption engine allows a choice of encryption method. 




                     
3 Chief of Naval Operations, “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower,” 17 October 2007, 6. 
4 Ross Mayfield, GHOSTNet, working white paper, e-mailed to author 27 
January 2009. 
quicker, less expensive, and more robust when compared to 




Figure 1.   GHOSTNet Architecture  
 
GHOSTNet offers a secure and anonymous Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) service that is unique in both implementation 
and features. GHOSTNet couples Ethernet tunneling and proxy 
services to provide users safe and anonymous Internet 
access. Users can connect via wired or wireless connections 
and on trusted and untrusted networks making GHOSTNet 
perfect for home users, corporate personnel, and deployed 
personnel. 
4 
GHOSTNet utilizes TLS (SSL) protocol with AES-256 
encryption to secure the network, currently the strongest 
commercial encryption available. GHOSTNet also incorporated 
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the use of 1024 or 2048 bit PKI certificates and HMAC 
protection from replay attacks and UDP flooding. 
This research will focus on the evaluation of the 
applicability and feasibility of employing a secure Virtual 
Private Network Infrastructure as a Global Command and 
Control gateway to dynamically connect and disconnect 
diverse forces on a task-force-by-task-force basis.  Field 
testing areas being examined include the evaluation of 
video, voice, and data transmissions via a laptop computer 
to a remote command and control center from a maritime 
interdiction team conducting a MIO boarding onboard a vessel 
underway, or anchored. Utilizing GHOSTNet, the boarding team 
could securely pass all information, video, biometric data, 
and so forth directly to the entire MIO chain of command as 
it is captured.  This would directly enable a MIO boarding 
to become safer for the VBSS teams, quicker in execution, 
and provide more utility in the area of intelligence 
gathering and documentation.  From a C2 perspective, the MIO 
commander, ship CO, and all respective Tactical Action 
Officers (TAOs) and watch captains would have instant access 
to the conduct and progress of the boarding in near real 
time.  Intelligence specialists would be able to receive key 
items of interest as they are discovered onboard instead of 
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II. TECHNOLOGY BACKGROUND 
A. VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS 
Virtual Private Networks (VPN) make use of the public 
Internet establishing a cost-effective secure network 
allowing companies to connect physically separated workers 
and remote business locations without the high cost of 
leasing or purchasing private circuits.  While the company’s 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) and other Internet users are 
completely unaware of the secure connection that has been 
established, the companies’ workers are able to perform 
their duties as if they were physically in the office and 
have direct access to the resources they need.5 
B. TUNNELING 
Tunneling is the transfer of data between two similar 
or dissimilar networks via an intermediate network.  
Tunneling encloses one type of data packet into the packet 
of another protocol.  Before the encapsulation takes place, 
the packets are encrypted so that the data is unreadable to 
anyone monitoring the network.  These encapsulated packets 
travel through the Internet, which serves as one example of 
an intermediate network until they reach their destination.  
Upon arrival, the packets are decrypted and returned to 
their original format.  The protocol of encapsulating 
packets is understood by the network and by both the points 
where the packet enters and exits the network.  Tunneling 
                     
5 John Mairs, VPNs; A Beginners’ Guide (Berkley, CA: McGraw Hill, 
2002), 78. 
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enables you to place the packet that uses a protocol not 
used by the Internet inside an IP packet and send it 
securely over the Internet.  You can use private, non-
routable, IP addresses inside a packet that uses an assigned 
public, routable IP address to tunnel your private network 
through the Internet.   
C. TUNNELING PROTOCOLS 
The General Routing Encapsulation (GRE) provides a 
standard for tunneling data and is defined in the Institute 
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Request for 
Comments (RFCs) 1701 and 1702 (available from 
www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1701 and www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1702).  The 
concept of GRE is that a protocol header and delivery header 
are added to the original packet and its payload is 
encapsulated in the new packet. There are three main Layer 2 
VPN technologies defined in the RFCs that use encryption 
methods and provide for user authentication:  Layer 2 is the 
data link layer of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) 
model, a 7 layer model that defines standards of 
communication on routable networks. 
 
Figure 2.   7 Layer OSI Model 
 
1. Point to Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP).  PPTP 
uses GRE for encapsulation and can tunnel IP, IPX, and other 
packages over the Internet.  The main disadvantage is the 
restriction that there can only be one tunnel at a time 
between communication partners. 
2. Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP).  L2TP is the 
industry standard.  It combines he advantages of L2F and 
PPTP without suffering form their disadvantages.  It does 
not provide its own security, but it can be combined with 
other technologies that do offer encryption such as IPSEC. 
3. Layer 2 Security Protocol (L2Sec).  L2SEC was 
developed to provide a solution to the security flaws of 
IPSec.  The overhead, which is defined as the amount of 
format information stored in the packet header, that when is 
combined with the assembly and disassembly of packets 
reduces transmission speed, is huge and L2SEC uses Secure 
Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS). 
9 
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IPSec is the most widespread tunneling technology.  It 
was developed as the Internet Security Standard on Layer 3 
by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in 1995.  
IPSec can be used to encapsulate any traffic of application 
layers, but no traffic of lower network layers.  Neither, 
network frames, IPX, or broadcast messages can be 
transferred.  IPSec uses a variety of encryption protocols 
and authentication protocols.  The two prevalent methods 
used by IPsec are: 
1. Tunnel Mode.  The tunnel mode encapsulates the 
whole IP packet into a new packet and sends the new packet 
to the endpoint.  This protects the addresses of the sender 
and recipient, as well as all other metadata, or meta-
information. Metadata is defined as  data about other data 
and can represent a datum or a collection of data. 
2. Transport Mode.  In transport mode, only the 
payload of the data is encrypted and encapsulated.  This 
significantly reduces the overhead, but an attacker can 
easily read the metadata and find out who is communicating, 
although the data is encrypted and protected. 
D. VPN SECURITY 
The goals of VPN security is to: to provide privacy of 
data transferred, ensure the integrity of the data, and 
ensure that the data is available when it is needed.  This 
is accomplished using either symmetric encryption or 
asymmetric encryption. 
1. Symmetric Encryption.  In this method, both the 
sender and receiver use the same key to encrypt and decrypt 
the message.  Everyone who has the key can decrypt the 
traffic, and if the key is compromised, the entire VPN is 
compromised.  Symmetric Encryption schemes are susceptible 
to a multitude of attacks such as brute force attack (a 
method for breaking cryptographic systems by systematically 
trying a large number of keys in a key space in order to 
decrypt a message), and man-in-the-middle attacks (attacker 
intercepting the data between sender and receiver, copy, and 
forward without the sender or receiver realizing their 
traffic has been intercepted). Systems utilizing a symmetric 
encryption scheme should change keys frequently and utilize 
a combination of key lifetime and key length to ensure that 




Figure 3.   Symmetric Encryption System (All In One CISSP)6 
                     
11 
6 Shon Harris, All In One CISSP Exam Guide (San Francisco, CA: McGraw 
Hill, 2008), 680. 
 
Figure 4.   Man in the Middle Attack (All In One CISSP)7 
 
2. Asymmetric Encryption. In asymmetric cryptography, 
each user has a public and a private key. The public key is 
known to everyone, and it is used to encrypt the message, 
and since both keys are created linked by a mathematical 
algorithm, only the receivers private key can decrypt the 
messaged. In this public key system, users must ensure that 
their private key is kept secure. 
 12
                     
7 Shon Harris, All In One CISSP Exam Guide, 681.  
 
Figure 5.   Asymmetric Encryption System (All In One CISSP)8 
 
3. Hash Function. A hash function takes a block of 
data and returns a fixed-size bit string, hash value, such 
that an accidental or intentional change to the data will 
change the hash value. The ideal hash function has four main 
properties: it is easy to compute the hash for any given 
data, it is extremely difficult to construct a test that has 
a given hash, it is extremely difficult to modify a given 
test without changing its hash, and it is extremely unlikely 
that two different messages will have the same hash. Hash 
functions are used for message integrity checks, ensuring 
the data is whole or complete, digital signatures, a form of 
asymmetric cryptography to ensure non-repudiation, 
authentication, and other various information security 
applications.  
                     
13
8 Shon Harris. All In One CISSP Exam Guide, 701. 
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E. DIFFIE-HELLMAN KEY EXCHANGE 
The Diffe-Hellman encryption system was developed in 
1976 to solve the problem of key distribution for private 
key encryption systems and the need to find a secure way of 
deciding on a private key using the same method of 
communications that you are trying to protect.9 This enables 
users to exchange symmetric keys making prior arrangements. 
The Diffie-Hellman algorithm is susceptible to the man-in 
the-middle attack (see Figure 4) and thus other protocol, 
such as authentication, prior to exchanging public keys.  
 
9 Eric Maiwald, Fundamentals of Network Security (Burr Ridge, IL: 
McGraw-Hill, 2004), 324. 
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III. GHOSTNET SETUP 
A. INSTALLATION OF OPENVPN FOR THE SERVER AND CLIENT 
OpenVPN software can be downloaded from 
www.openvpn.net/downloads. OpenVPN runs on most operating 
systems (OS) to include Microsoft© Windows 2000/XP/Vista, 
Solaris, BSD, and Mac OS X. The installation of OpenVPN is 
standard for both the client and the server. Once the 
configuration is completed and tested, the client 
configuration file can be copied and used for all other 
clients, just ensure that you change the name of the 
client’s key and cert to match the ones provided for that 
client. 
1. End User Installation 
GHOSTNet uses an open source set up file, OpenVPN, for 
installation. The systems must be able to support the 
Universal TUN/TAP drivers. The easiest installation would be 
to install the OpenVPN GUI that will allow the opening and 
closing of tunnels by the user.  GHOSTNet can also be run as 
a service and will start automatically on startup.  Once you 
have downloaded the installation files, set up is 
accomplished by following the setup wizard.  
a. Accept the end user license agreement. 
b. Select the components and services you want to 
install (the standard components make sense in most 
applications). 
c. Select an installation directory (in most cases this 
will be c:\program files\openvpn). 
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d. The wizard will complete the installation. 
After the installation is finished, you must copy the 
correct configuration file along with keys that are provided 
by your network administrator into the c:\program 
files\openvpn directory.   
2. Establishing Connection with a GHOSTNet Secure 
Server 
To establish the secure connection with the GHOSTNet 
server, ensure you are connected to a network via an 
Ethernet cable or wirelessly, and right click on the 
shortcut in the toolbar and select the GHOSTNet_1194 
connection.  This will run the configuration file located in 
the c:\program files\openVPN directory. Once the connection 
is established, you will see the green computers indicating 
a secure connection in the system icon tray.   
3. Verifying the Secure Connection 
Once the connection has been established and the 
OpenVPN GUI in the windows toolbar displays a secure 
connection (changes color from red to green), you can verify 
you have a secure connection by accomplishing the following 
steps: 
To verify that your network traffic is being routed 
through the tunnel created, use a web browser to go to 
www.whatismyipaddress.com.  This will indicate that you have 
an IP address from Road Proxy and you are being routed from 
Greensboro, North Carolina, or New Haven, Connecticut. 
Browse to www.xxx.com to check your proxy connection. A 
proxy is an intermediary between an external and internal 
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application. This intermediary usually pretends to be the 
end point for both sides of the connection and accepts the 
client request, rewrites it and sends it to the server. 
Return traffic is handled the same way. Application Level 
Gateway (ALG) and Web Proxy are common name for devices that 
do this method of mediating traffic is slower than normal as 
the gateway must decode/encode the packets and extra time.  
B. RUNNING OPENVPN AS A SERVER ON WINDOWS 
To run OpenVPN as a server in Microsoft Windows©, 
complete the install as previously described for the client. 
Then go to the control panel, administrative tools, 
services, and service manager.  Find the entry OpenVPN 
Service and double click the entry.  Under startup, select 
automatic.  OpenVPN will know try to start a tunnel for 
every .ovpn file it finds in the config directory.10 A 
sample configuration file for the server can be located in 
Appendix B. Ensure that the router has been set up for port 
forwarding and that an entry exist in the advanced routing 
to properly route the VPN traffic to the server. 
 
10 Markus Feilner, OpenVPN: Building and Integrating Virtual Private 
Networks (Brimingham, UK: Packt Publishing Ltd., 2006), 95. 
 
Figure 6.   Linksys® WRTG54GS Port Range Forwarding entry 
 
 
Figure 7.   Linksys® WRTG65GS Advanced Routing entry 
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Figure 8.   Linksys® WRT54GS Routing Table entry 
 
1. Creating x509 Certificates 
In the OpenVPN\easy-rsa directory, create a folder 
named keys and copy the files serial.start and 
index.txt.start into the folder.  Rename the files to serial 
and index.txt respectively.11 These files will be used as a 
database for certificate generation. 
To prepare the standard configuration for the 
certificates, double click on the c:\program 
files\openvpn\easy-rsa\init-config.bat file to copy a 
template of the vars.bat.sample to vars.bat and 
openssl.cnf.sample to openvpn.ssl. Next, you will need to 
edit the vars.bat file (this file contains variables used by 
OpenVPN’s scripts to create certificates).12 Right click on 
the vars.bat file.  The changes you make in the vars.bat 
file standardize the key generation process and prevent you 




                     
11 Markus Feilner, OpenVPN: Building and Integrating Virtual Private 
Networks, 110. 





Leave as specified 
setKey-Config=openssl.cnf Leave as specified 
Set Key_Dir=keys Leave as specified 
Set Key_Size=1024 Change to 2048 
Set Key_Country=US Change as needed 
Set Key_Province=CA Change as needed 
Set Key_City=SanFrancisco Change as needed 
Set Key_ORG=FortFunston Change as needed 
Set Key-EMAIl=mail@hsot.domain Change as needed 
Table 1.   Vars.bat entries 
 
2. Creating the Diffie-Hellman Key 
To create the keys that will be used for encryption, 
authentication, and key exchange start the batch file from 
the command prompt c:\ProgramFiles\OpenVPN\easy-rsa\build-
dh.bat.  The Diffie-Hellman key will be generated for you. 
3. Building the Certificate Authority 
From the command prompt, enter build-ca.bat.  This 
batch file generates a self signed certificate for the CA 
that can be used to create and sign client certificates to 
authenticate other machines. If you do not need to change 
any of the data entered in the vars.bat file entered in para 
E simply press enter and the certificate for the CA will be 
generated in the keys directory. 
4. Generating Server and Client Keys 
To generate the server key and have it signed by the CA 
created in para G., type “build-key-server.bat “the name of 
your VPN Server.””  This will generate a 2048-bit private 
key.  You will be asked for extra attributes other than 
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those provided from the vars.bat file, including the ability 
for a password.  If you choose to enter a password, no one 
can set up a connection without this password.  After the 
certificate is generated, you will be asked if you want to 
have it signed by the CA. Enter ‘Y’ twice to have it signed. 
To create the client keys enter “build-key.bat “name of 
the client”” and follow the steps outlined above. 
Additionally, ensure you enter a unique “Common Name” for 
every client key that you create, otherwise the key will not 
be signed by the CA and you will not be able to authenticate 
with the server. 
5. Keys to Transfer to the Client 
Three files must be transferred to the client securely 
to establish the connection; vpn-client.crt, vpn-client.key, 
and ca.crt.  
6. Configuring OpenVPN to Use Certificates 
A sample configuration file for the server and client 
has been included in Appendix B, and during install, sample 
configuration files are available in the sample 
configuration folder. To configure OpenVPN server to use the 
certificates created, open the configuration file in 
Notepad. Ensure the following entries are made, noting the 
mapping to the correct folder for the certificates and keys. 
You will have to securely deliver the client their 




























Table 2.   x509 certificate configuration file entries 
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IV. EXPERIMENT METHODOLOGY 
A. COASTS 
Cooperative Operations and Applied Science & Technology 
Studies (COASTS) is an international field experimentation 
program at the Naval Postgraduate School, designed to 
develop and assess commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and 
leading edge technologies for specific military, 
peacekeeping and stability operations, law enforcement, and 
first responder missions. COASTS engages international and 
domestic partners at the research and development (R&D) 
level through cooperative science and technology field 
experimentation to investigate and match participant mission 
needs with integrated command and control, computers, 
communications, intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (C4ISR) solutions in domestic, bi-lateral and 
multi-national environments. 
 COASTS conducts integrated, multi-phase scenarios to 
demonstrate and evaluate these C4ISR solutions over a series 
of five field experiments (FEX I – V), which ultimately 
culminate at FEX V in the final demonstration scenarios.   
1. Technical Overview 
The scope of the specific research encompasses the 
technology related to the applicability and feasibility of 
connecting users via a VPN utilizing the technologies of an 
emerging capability—called GHOSTNet—to remotely view 
streaming video, control desktop applications, participate 
in video teleconferencing using various wireless networks 
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via simulation and field experimentation.  GHOSTNet can be 
used as the underlying infrastructure to connect any 
GHOSTNet enabled device to any other GHOSTNet enabled device 
in a mission specific manner.  
The GHOSTNet open VPN application is used to establish 
secure communications between multiple remote network 
clients via tunneling.  Tunneling is a process by which a 
client can access a Private network utilizing the Public 
Internet, given the proper security capabilities and 
configurations of both the client and the network in order 
to establish the connection. 
2. FEX-II/III 
In January and February 2008, Field Exercise II and III 
were conducted and utilized as local site survey evolutions 
and network preparation exercises to support field 
requirements for FEX IV and V, the COASTS-08 final scenario 
and demonstrations in Thailand.  McMillen Airfield in Camp 
Roberts, CA, was the site of both FEX II and III, the second 
and third iterations of COASTS field exercises, which took 
place in the vicinity of a runway and transiting 
installations.  This strategic location provided a chance to 
deploy and test realistic network topologies and link 
scenarios.  The physical network architecture and layout 
that would be employed in Thailand during FEX IV and V was 
constructed using the runway, installations, and roads 
surrounding the McMillen Airstrip, see Figure 9, below.  
Valuable lessons learned and network requirements were 
gained from performing the required tests on the actual 
equipment configurations that were planned to be 
demonstrated in the following months in Thailand.  
 
 
Figure 9.   Network Architecture for FEX II/III 
 
Also, contributing to FEX III was the United States 
Coast Guard (USCG) from their USCG Station at Monterey Bay.  
The USCG provided the use of a 41-foot utility boat for use 
in testing while underway in Monterey Bay.  It was 
specifically an opportunity to conduct proof of concept 
testing for the wireless network provided by the Vivato 
phased array base station, the Ruckus device, and the 
GHOSTNet application.  This testing configuration would 
mimic the underway demonstration that would occur later in 
Thailand.13 
                     
25 
13 Andrew P. Rivas, “Implementation of Phased Array Antenna 
Technology Providing a Wireless Local Area Network to Enhance Port 
Security and Maritime Interdiction Operations,” Master’s thesis, in 
progress, Naval Postgraduate School. 
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3. FEX-IV/V 
Field Exercise IV and V, conducted in March and May 
2008, respectively, took place at Ao Manao Airbase in 
Prachuap Khiri Khan, Thailand, which is located 
approximately 312 km, or 194 miles, south of Bangkok.  All 
successful implementations of equipment and experiments at 
FEX II and III would be deployed at Ao Manao for further 
operational testing and development. For the Vivato – 
GHOSTNet wireless network, FEX IV and V would be used to tie 
together network tests conducted at Monterey Bay and Camp 
Roberts. 
4. Scope of Testing 
The intent of the Vivato—GHOSTNet testing was to 
demonstrate the feasibility of utilizing an wireless 802.11g 
network over water and land in order to provide secure 
Global Data Dissemination (GD2) to physically remote 
operational commanders and their staff.  From a remote C2 
center, the planning staff would have the ability to view 
and receive video, voice, and data from a naval unit 
conducting a maritime interdiction operation (MIO) boarding 
on an underway vessel.   
5. Selected Metrics 
There were multiple protocols available to demonstrate 
video streaming (e.g., TCP/IP, UDP, RTSP, Unicast, Multicast 
and P2P), but only TCP/IP was tested since it is directly 
attributed to the scope of this thesis.  The metrics used 
for these tests were: throughput—as measured by bulk 
 27
transport capacity; response time—as measured by roundtrip 
delay and loss; and video streaming—as measured by 
throughput thresholds on video packets. 
6. Throughput 
Throughput measures the maximum amount of intended data 
transferred across a communications link or network.  It 
does not include any additional packets or encryption 
overhead that may be transferred due to strong encryption 
schemes implemented or multiple data transmissions over the 
wireless medium which would constitute the total data rate.  
The method used to perform this measurement is to transfer a 
“large” file (3 Mb) between two network nodes and measure 
the time taken to receive the file.  The throughput is then 
calculated by dividing the file size by the time to get the 
intended data in megabits, kilobits, or bits per second. 
7. Response Time 
Response time is a measure of effectiveness related to 
the amount of time it takes a data packet to traverse a 
given distance.  Essentially, it is the elapsed time between 
the end of an inquiry on a computer system and the beginning 
of a response.  Network performance monitoring tools were 
configured to measure and display various parameters 
characterizing communications between or among a pair of 
network endpoints, or nodes. In TCP/IP-based networks, one 
such parameter was the network Round Trip Time (RTT). 
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As a control measure, the RTT was measured from the 
“Chariot Box,” the shore-based endpoint location, to 
eliminate any inconsistencies related to tests taken at 
various locations. 
8. Video Streaming 
Video streaming refers to the ability of an application 
to play synchronized video media streams, in a continuous 
way, while they are being transmitted to the client over a 
data network 
9. Measures of Effectiveness and Performance 
The COASTS-08 Field Exercises provided an environment 
in which to test the qualitative measurements of the Vivato—
GHOSTNet Network.  The Measures of Performance (MOPs) 
directed that bandwidth and throughput performance of a 
network were the most important factors for testing.  The 
qualitative measures were formed by reviewing the COASTS-06 
and COAST-07 after action reports (AARs) that showed 
considerable network degradation during high bandwidth usage 
and video streaming evolutions.  For the Measures of 
Effectiveness (MOE), Ixia’s IxChariot was implemented to 
collect, display, and analyze the pertinent information 
related to network performance characteristics referenced in 
the selected metrics listed above.  The raw test data was 
collected and downloaded into a Comma Separated ‘CSV’ and 
Hyper Text Markup Language ‘html’ for compatibility reasons, 
and easier analysis at a later date.  
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10. Test Equipment 
Three laptops were used for the field testing of the 
Vivato—GHOSTNet Network.  The laptops’ specifications are as 
follows: 
1. Dell Inspiron 5100 (Chariot Box/EndPoint1) (1.0 
GHz Intel Pentium II processor; 512MB RAM; and Microsoft 
Windows© XP, service pack 2) 
2. Two Apple® Mac Books (Endpoints 2/3). (2.4 GHz 
Intel Core 2 Duo processor; 2GB RAM; Mac OS X and Windows XP 
service pack 2 – running off of VMware)  
11. Testing Software 
Ixia IxChariot was used as the basic network software 
package to conduct all network tests.  IxChariot is a 
software tool for simulating real-world applications to 
predict device and system performance under realistic load 
conditions by utilizing packet generation and analysis.  
Comprised of the IxChariot Console, Performance Endpoints, 
and IxProfile, the IxChariot product offers thorough network 
performance assessment and device testing by simulating 
hundreds of protocols across the network.   
B. FIELD TESTING CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
1. Proof of Concept Testing 
The purpose of this preliminary phase of testing was to 
execute a basic test and evaluation plan under reasonably 
moderate operating conditions on Monterey Bay before 
expending time and resources to field tests in Thailand. 
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With the assistance of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) 
Station Monterey Bay, underway testing commenced on February 
14, 2008.  
At the USCG Station, one Vivato base station was 
mounted overlooking Monterey Bay, at a height of eye of 
approximately 25 feet, and connected to the Internet. A Dell 
laptop was associated to the Vivato network via Wireless 
802.11g at the USCG Station and served as the shore endpoint 
for the data packet transfer test from the Macbook 
(Macintosh laptop) endpoint underway. Aboard a 41-foot 
utility boat (UTB), a Ruckus device [router] was mounted to 
the mast and an Axis 213 camera was configured to a Dell 
laptop and secured inside the pilot house to pass video 
across the wireless network. The Macbook was connected via 
Wireless 802.11g to the Ruckus router in order to transmit 
data packets across the wireless network. 
The focus of the testing was to observe the ability to 
transfer data packets and provide streaming video from the 
utility boat (laptops) to the USCG Station ashore and to a 
remote command center (JOCC at McMillen Airfield) over 100 
miles away at Camp Roberts, CA. See Figure 10.  
2. Observations from Initial Testing at the USCG 
Station 
On February 14, 2008, the day of testing, a small craft 
advisory was issued for the area, indicating swells of to x 
feet and wind between 22-33 knots.  
Due to the rough conditions on the bay, maneuverability 
was limited. The performance limitations of the wireless 
network included the height of the swells observed on 
Monterey Bay, which affected the line of sight (LOS) of the 
Ruckus device [mounted to the UTB mast] and the phased array 
antenna [mounted at USCG Station]. The Ruckus device ceased 
to operate correctly after it experienced seawater 
intrusion, following the 3 NM test, due to sea swells 
contacting the mast and the pilot house of the UTB. The 
Macbook maintained association with the Vivato phased array 
antenna throughout the underway testing.  Video streaming 
from the IP camera was successfully observed, at 2 and 3 NM 
tests, from the USCG Station Dell laptop and a Dell laptop 





Figure 10.   Distance between Monterey Bay and Camp Roberts, 

















Figure 12.   GPS plots of FEX-IV over-water tests. (From: 
GoogleEarth) 
3. Observations from Ao-Mano, Thailand 
Testing in Ao-Mano, Thailand, was conducted from March 
24–25 2008. Both days were calm with visibility 
approximately 3.5–4 miles. The high temperature on 24 March 
was 96 degrees Fahrenheit and a low of 76 degrees. On 25 
March, the high was 91 degrees with a low of 77 degrees. 
Both days provided a barometric pressure of approximately 
29.80 inches with humidity averaging about 90%.  Five tests 
were conducted over the two days. 
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a. Test One: Vivato Baseline Test 
The first test was a baseline test of the Vivato 
network. This allowed the capturing of the response time 
with no users online and no encryption on the network. Due 
to time restrictions, only three tests were conducted with 
GHOSTNet enabled and six were conducted without GHOSTNet 
enabled.  
The response time with GHOSTNet enabled measured 
at 1.223 seconds with a minimum time of .880 seconds, a 
maximum time of 19.2, and average 95% confidence interval 
(CI) of .7328. The average throughput measured at .01 Mbps 
with a minimum throughput of .001 Mbps, a maximum throughput 
of .012 Mbps, and a 95% CI of .0018. The average transaction 
rate measured at .9702 seconds with a minimum rate of .052 
seconds, a maximum rate of 1.137 seconds, and a 95% CI of 
.1437.  
The average response time without GHOSTNet enabled 
measured at .1533 with a minimum time of .004 seconds, a 
maximum of time of 18.104 seconds and a 95% CI of .2513. The 
average throughput measured at .2485 Mbps with a minimum 
throughput of .001 Mbps, a maximum throughput of 2.476 Mbps, 
and a 95% CI of .1307. The average transaction rate measured 
at 24.9467 seconds with a minimum rate of .055 seconds, a 
maximum rate of 227.273 seconds, and a 95% CI of 12.5855. 
 
Figure 13.   Vivato Response Time Baseline with GHOSTNet 
Enabled 
 
Figure 14.   Vivato Throughput Baseline with GHOSTNet Enabled 
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Figure 15.   Vivato Transaction Rate Baseline with GHOSTNET 
Enabled 
 




Figure 17.   Vivato Throughput Baseline without GHOSTNet 
Enabled 
 





b. Test Two: Communications Tower to Prachuap 
Beach Hotel 
The second test was conducted between endpoint 1 
located at the communications tower (11˚ 47’ 10” N/099˚ 48’ 
34 E) and endpoint 2 located at the Prachuap Beach Hotel 
(11˚ 48’ 08” N/099˚ 47’ 58” E).  
The average response time with GHOSTNET enabled 
measured at 1.181 seconds with a minimum time of .884 
seconds, a maximum time of 3.041 seconds and a 95% CI of 
.4087. The average throughput measured at .009 Mbps with a 
minimum throughput of .003 Mbps, a maximum throughput of 
.012 Mbps, and a 95% CI of .0027. The average transaction 
rate measured was .858 seconds with a minimum rate of .329 
seconds, a maximum rate of 1.144, and a 95% CI of .2643.  
The average response time without GHOSTNet enabled 
measured at.0375 seconds with a minimum time of .005 
seconds, a maximum time of .894 seconds and a 95% CI of 
.0368. The average throughput measured was .3260 Mbps with a 
minimum of throughput .012 Mbps, a maximum throughput of 2.0 
Mbps, and a 95% CI of .3525. The average transaction rate 
measured at 31.517 seconds with a minimum rate of 1.119 




Figure 19.   Prachuap Beach Hotel Response Time with GHOSTNet 
Enabled 
 




Figure 21.   Prachuap Beach Hotel Transaction Rate with 
GHOSTNet Enabled 
 




Figure 23.   Prachuap Beach Hotel Throughput without GHOSTNet 
Enabled 
 





c. Test Three: Communications Tower to PCF 
Underway at 2NM 
The third test was conducted between endpoint 1 
located at the communications tower (11˚ 47’ 10” N/099˚ 48’ 
34” E) and endpoint 2 located at the onboard the PCF while 
underway at 2NM (11˚ 46’ 32” N /099˚ 48’ 43” E). Due to time 
restrictions on the PCFs underway, time testing was 
conducted on the system without GHOSTNet enabled. Further 
testing was conducted with GHOSTNet enabled while the PCF 
was pier side (see test 5).  
The average response time without GHOSTNet enabled 
measured at 2.5207 seconds with a minimum time of .010 
seconds, a maximum time of 19.537 seconds and a 95% CI of 
3.8978. The average throughput measured at .2363 Mbps with a 
minimum throughput of .001 Mbps, a maximum throughput of 
1.02 Mbps, and a 95% CI of .1952. The average transaction 
rate measured at 11.9967 seconds with a minimum rate of .051 
seconds, a maximum rate of 96.154 seconds, and a 95% CI of 
18.7745. 
 
Figure 25.   Vivato to PCF Response Time without GHOSTNet 
Enabled 
 




Figure 27.   Vivato to PCF Transaction Rate without GHOSTNet 
Enabled 
 
d. Test Four: Communications Tower to Ao Manao 
BOQ 
The fourth test was conducted between endpoint 1 
located at the communications tower (11˚ 47’ 10” N/099˚ 48’ 
34 E) and endpoint 2 located at the Ao Manao BOQ (11˚ 46’ 
35” N/099˚ 47’ 50” E).  
The response time with GHOSTNET enabled measured 
at 1.0327 seconds with a minimum time of .871, a maximum 
time of 1.653 and a 95% confidence interval (CI) of .1017. 
The average throughput measured at .01 Mbps with a minimum 
of throughput of .006, a maximum throughput of .012, and a 
95% CI of .0017. The average transaction rate measured at 
.9727 seconds with a minimum rate of .605 seconds, a maximum 
rate of 1.148, and a 95% CI of .1697.  
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The average response time without GHOSTNet 
disabled measured at .6698, with a minimum time of .055 
seconds, a maximum time of 18.904 seconds and a 95% CI of 
1.0118. The average throughput measured at .1377 Mbps, with 
a minimum throughput of .001 Mbps, a maximum throughput of 
2.6 Mbps, and a 95% CI of .2303. The average transaction 
rate measured at 13.2558 seconds with a minimum rate of .053 





Figure 28.   Ao Mano Response with GHOSTNet 
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Figure 29.   Ao Manao Throughput with GHOSTNET 
 
Figure 30.   Ao Manao Transaction Rate with GHOSTNet 
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Figure 31.   Ao Manao Response Time without GHOSTNet 
 
Figure 32.   Ao Manao Throughput without GHOSTNet 
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Figure 33.   Ao Manao Transaction Rate without GHOSTNet 
 
e. Test Five: Communications Tower to PCF Pier 
The fifth test was conducted between endpoint 1 
located at the communications tower (11˚ 47’ 10” N/099˚ 48’ 
34” E) and endpoint 2 located at the onboard the PCF pier 
side (11˚ 48’ 29” N/099˚ 48’ 08” E). The original intent of 
this testing was to conclude the underway testing with 
GHOSTNet enabled, but unfortunately due to weather 
restrictions, the PCF was unable to get underway. It must be 
noted that this testing was difficult to complete while pier 
side due to the numerous other vessels that were docked and 
the interference imposed by their masts.  
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The average response time with GHOSTNET enabled 
measured at 11.4763 seconds with a minimum time of .914 
seconds, a maximum time of 38.854 seconds and a 95% CI of 
32.4613. The average throughput measured at .001 Mbps with a 
minimum of throughput of .000 Mbps, a maximum throughput of 
.011 Mbps, and a 95% CI of .0037. The average transaction 
rate measured at .1060 seconds with a minimum rate of .027 
seconds, a maximum rate of 1.094, and a 95% CI of .3590.  
 
 





Figure 35.   Vivato to Pier Throughput with GHOSTNet enabled 
 





4. Conclusions from Ao-Manao Thailand 
As the data shows, the network experienced slow 
response times, low throughput rates, slow transaction 
times, and excessive latency when GHOSTNet was enabled. Due 
to the slowness, it was determined that it may be coming 
from GHOSTNet connecting to the servers located in New 
Haven, Connecticut, or Greensboro, North Carolina. To test 
this theory a GHOSTNet server was established in Monterey, 
California. Below are the results of the testing conducted 
in Monterey. 
 
Server Latency (ms) Upload (kb/s) Download (kb/s) 
San Francisco 16 335 2364 
Chicago 60 347 1206 
Parsippany 55 306 1818 
Toronto 94 348 1948 
Table 3.   Speed and Latency Test with Local GHOSTNet Server 
Connected 
 
Server Latency (ms) Upload (kb/s) Download (kb/s) 
San Francisco 8 333 1589 
Chicago 47 334 1155 
Parsippany 71 358 1890 
Toronto 94 335 1863 
Table 4.   Speed and Latency Test with No GHOSTNet Server 
Connected 
 
Server Latency (ms) Upload (kb/s) Download (kb/s) 
San Francisco 126 918 178 
Chicago 119 917 220 
Parsippany 279 625 160 
Fort Worth 120 765 184 
Table 5.   Speed and Latency Test with GHOSTNet connected to 
New Haven, CT Server 
 52
a. Test One: Baseline of System in Monterey, CA 
The first test was conducted between endpoint 1 
located and endpoint 2 to baseline the system. Both 
endpoints were connected wirelessly to the same network 
(192.168.1.1), and the test was conducted with GHOSTNet 
disabled and enabled.  
The average response time with GHOSTNET enabled 
measured at .0310 seconds with a minimum time of .023 
seconds, a maximum time of .159 seconds and a 95% CI of 
0025. The average throughput measured at 2.4042 Mbps with a 
minimum throughput of .476 Mbps, a maximum throughput of 
3.025 Mbps, and a 95% CI of .2047. The average transaction 
rate measured at 32.3963 seconds with a minimum rate of 
6.289 seconds, a maximum rate of 40.00, and a 95% CI of 
2.4867.  
The average response time with GHOSTNet disabled 
measured at .0225 with a minimum time of .011 seconds, a 
maximum time of .055 seconds and a 95% CI of .0025. The 
average throughput measured at 4.4682 Mbps with a minimum 
throughput of .0635 Mbps, a maximum throughput of 6.874 
Mbps, and a 95% CI of .3435. The average transaction rate 
measured at 49.5712 seconds with a minimum rate of 8.403 




Figure 37.   Home Baseline Response Time with GHOSTNet 
Enabled 
 
Figure 38.   Home Baseline Throughput with GHOSTNet Enabled 
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Figure 39.   Home Baseline Transaction Rate with GHOSTNet 
Enabled 
 




Figure 41.   Home Baseline Throughput without GHOSTNet 
Enabled 
 





b. Test Two: Testing Between USCG Station 
Monterey Bay and Local GHOSTNet Server 
The second test was conducted between endpoint 1 
located at the Coast Guard Station (36°36’33”N 121°53”49”W 
and endpoint 2 colocated with the local GHOSTNet Server 
(36°37’54”N 121°48’24”W). Endpoint 1 was wired via Ethernet 
to the Coast Guard Stations Network, endpoint 2 was 
associated wirelessly to the network colocated with the 
local GHOSTNet server, and the test was conducted with 
GHOSTNet enabled.  
The average response time measured at .923 seconds 
with a minimum time of .0237 seconds, a maximum time of 
84.589 seconds and a 95% CI of .69. The average throughput 
measured at .252 Mbps with a minimum throughput of .017 
Mbps, a maximum throughput of .319 Mbps, and a 95% CI of 
.029. The average transaction rate measured at 1.632 seconds 
with a minimum rate of .012 seconds, a maximum rate of 4.129 
seconds, and a 95% CI of .386.  
 
 
Figure 43.   Coast Guard Station to Local GHOSTNet Server 
Response Time 
 




Figure 45.   Coast Guard Station to Local GHOSTNet Server 
Transaction Rate 
 
c. Test Three: Voice Test 
The third test was conducted between endpoint 1 
located at the Coast Guard Station (36°36’33”N 121°53”49”W 
and endpoint 2 colocated with the local GHOSTNet Server 
(36°37’54”N 121°48’24”W). Endpoint 1 was wired via Ethernet 
to the Coast Guard Stations Network, endpoint 2 was 
associated wirelessly to the network colocated with the 
local GHOSTNet server, and the test was conducted with 
GHOSTNet enabled. The purpose of this test was to measure 
the quality of voice data being sent across the network.  
The average response time measured at .24 seconds 
with a minimum time of .203 seconds, a maximum time of .361 
seconds and a 95% CI of .025. The average throughput 
measured at .015 Mbps with a minimum throughput of .012 
58 
Mbps, a maximum throughput of .019 Mbps, and a 95% CI of 
.0017. The average transaction rate measured at 4.27 seconds 
with a minimum rate of 2.767 seconds, a maximum rate of 
4.934 seconds, and a 95% CI of .447.  
 
 
Figure 46.   Voice Test Response Time with GHOSTNet Connected 
Through the Local Server 
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Figure 47.   Voice Test Throughput with GHOSTNet Connected 
Through the Local Server 
 
Figure 48.   Voice Test Transaction Rate with GHOSTNet 
Connected Through the Local Server 
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d. Test Four: Video Test 
The fourth test was conducted between endpoint 1 
located at the Coast Guard Station (36°36’33”N 121°53”49”W 
and endpoint 2 colocated with the local GHOSTNet Server 
(36°37’54”N 121°48’24”W). Endpoint 1 was wired via Ethernet 
to the Coast Guard Stations Network, endpoint 2 was 
associated wirelessly to the network colocated with the 
local GHOSTNet server, and the test was conducted with 
GHOSTNet enabled. The purpose of this test was to measure 
the quality of video being sent across the network. Using 
IXChariot a 7.96 mb file was sent between the two endpoints. 
The average throughput measured at .064 Mbps with 
a minimum throughput of .049 Mbps, a maximum throughput of 
.062 Mbps. The average percent of loss data was .2. 
 
 
Figure 49.   Video Test Throughput with GHOSTNet Connected 













Figure 50.   Video Test Lost Data with GHOSTNet Connected 





                    
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
In the National Security Strategy of the United States 
of America, former President Bush outlines priorities to 
enhance the transformation of key institutions, to include 
improving the capacity of agencies to plan, prepare, 
coordinate, integrate, and execute responses covering the 
full range of crisis contingencies and long-term 
challenges.14 Additionally, President Bush points out that 
in order for domestic agencies to assist in keeping the 
United States secure, we must get better at interagency 
integration at home and abroad.15 GHOSTNet will enable DoD, 
Homeland Security, and local Law enforcement personnel to 
form networks to share information securely. The ideal 
placement GHOSTNet servers would be in a Maritime 
Headquarters with maritime Operations Center (MHQ with MOC). 
This would allow ships to dynamically connect to the command 
center and display, route, print, or brief any mission 
within the AOR prior to execution. MHQ staff personnel would 
be full apprised of any situation and could have the 
capability to watch any mission from Headquarters. 
Additionally, GHOSTNet could become a driving factor to 
assist the United States military transitions to Network-
Centric Warfare (NCW). NCW is the Tactic, Techniques, 
 
 
14 George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America,” March 2006, 45, available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-
060316.htm (accessed 30 April 2009). 
15 Ibid., 46. 
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Procedures (TTPs) that a networked force could employ to 
create an influential advantage to the deployed force. 
1. Key Findings 
Throughout the experiments conducted in support of this 
thesis, it was noted the response rate, throughput, and 
transaction rate of the network when GHOSTNet was enabled 
were significantly reduced, but not to the capacity to 
render the network useless.  Of note was the latency in the 
data when GHOSTNet was connected. Users experienced an 
average latency of 161 ms, and are more likely to disconnect 
the secure connection and pass traffic in the open at the 
risk of data being compromised as was seen during FEX V in 
Thailand. To reduce the latency experienced, a local 
GHOSTNet server was established. During initial testing 
latency was reduced from an average of 161 ms to an average 
56.25 ms. This significant decrease is comparable to the 
average latency, 55 ms, a user might experience through a 
non-secure internet connection. 
B. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
1. Future Research 
There are numerous research opportunities that can be 
conducted between a GHOSTNet enabled network and end user 
devices that could ultimately be utilized by Command and 
Control cells to pass data securely and assist in the 
transformation into the era of Network-Centric Warfare. 
Following are just two examples. 
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a. Mobile Communication Devices 
Technology in cellular phones has been greatly 
enhanced, and with the advent of the Blackberry®, iPhone®, 
and the gPhone®, users are continually networked.  
Future ideas include loading and testing the 
GHOSTNet architecture on mobile communication devices to 
transmit and send data securely across the network. 
b. Local GHOSTNet Server with Anonymization 
Although a local GHOSTNet server was established 
and tested in the Monterey area, further testing needs to be 
conducted on the latency once a proxy server has been added 
to the network architecture to provide anonymization for 
units that need this type of service.  
2. Summary 
The GHOSTNet application allows additional flexibility 
in securely connecting diverse units on an as-needed basis. 
The application also allows the Commanding Officer of units 
deployed conducting MIO to securely view, pass data, and 
communicate with their Boarding Officer and upper echelon 
chain of command via networks. This added capability could 
prove invaluable in the amount and quality of the 
intelligence gathered during this type of operations 
realizing the goals of Network-Centric Warfare. Different 
network designs that incorporate localized GHOSTNet servers 
allow for performance measures to nearly match those of 
traditional Internet based open networks so that a trade-off 
between performance and security need not be made. 
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APPENDIX: GHOSTNET SERVER AND CLIENT CONFIGURATION 
FILES 
A. WINDOWS XP SERVER CONFIGURATION FILE 
################################################# 
# Sample OpenVPN 2.0 config file for            # 
# multi-client server.                          # 
#                                               # 
# This file is for the server side              # 
# of a many-clients <-> one-server              # 
# OpenVPN configuration.                        # 
#                                               # 
# OpenVPN also supports                         # 
# single-machine <-> single-machine             # 
# configurations (See the Examples page         # 
# on the web site for more info).               # 
#                                               # 
# This config should work on Windows            # 
# or Linux/BSD systems.  Remember on            # 
# Windows to quote pathnames and use            # 
# double backslashes, e.g.:                     # 
# "C:\\Program Files\\OpenVPN\\config\\foo.key" # 
#                                               # 




# Which local IP address should OpenVPN 
# listen on? (optional) 
local 192.168.1.109 
# Which TCP/UDP port should OpenVPN listen on? 
# If you want to run multiple OpenVPN instances 
# on the same machine, use a different port 
# number for each one.  You will need to 
# open up this port on your firewall. 
port 1194 
mssfix 1400 
# TCP or UDP server? 
;proto tcp 
proto udp 
# "dev tun" will create a routed IP tunnel, 
# "dev tap" will create an ethernet tunnel. 
# Use "dev tap0" if you are ethernet bridging 
# and have precreated a tap0 virtual interface 
# and bridged it with your ethernet interface. 
# If you want to control access policies 
# over the VPN, you must create firewall 
# rules for the the TUN/TAP interface. 
# On non-Windows systems, you can give 
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# an explicit unit number, such as tun0. 
# On Windows, use "dev-node" for this. 
# On most systems, the VPN will not function 
# unless you partially or fully disable 




# Windows needs the TAP-Win32 adapter name 
# from the Network Connections panel if you 
# have more than one.  On XP SP2 or higher, 
# you may need to selectively disable the 
# Windows firewall for the TAP adapter. 
# Non-Windows systems usually don't need this. 
;dev-node MyTap 
# SSL/TLS root certificate (ca), certificate 
# (cert), and private key (key).  Each client 
# and the server must have their own cert and 
# key file.  The server and all clients will 
# use the same ca file. 
# See the "easy-rsa" directory for a series 
# of scripts for generating RSA certificates 
# and private keys.  Remember to use 
# a unique Common Name for the server 
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# and each of the client certificates. 
# Any X509 key management system can be used. 
# OpenVPN can also use a PKCS #12 formatted key file 
# (see "pkcs12" directive in man page). 




key Home_GN_Keys/VPN.key  # This file should be kept    
secret 
# Diffie hellman parameters. 
# Generate your own with: 
#   openssl dhparam -out dh1024.pem 1024 
# Substitute 2048 for 1024 if you are using 
# 2048 bit keys.  
dh Home_GN_Keys/dh1024.pem 
# Configure server mode and supply a VPN subnet 
# for OpenVPN to draw client addresses from. 
# The server will take 10.8.0.1 for itself, 
# the rest will be made available to clients. 
# Each client will be able to reach the server 
# on 10.8.0.1. Comment this line out if you are 
# ethernet bridging. See the man page for more info. 
server 10.8.0.0 255.255.252.0 
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# Maintain a record of client <-> virtual IP address 
# associations in this file.  If OpenVPN goes down or 
# is restarted, reconnecting clients can be assigned 
# the same virtual IP address from the pool that was 
# previously assigned. 
ifconfig-pool-persist ipp.txt 
# Configure server mode for ethernet bridging. 
# You must first use your OS's bridging capability 
# to bridge the TAP interface with the ethernet 
# NIC interface.  Then you must manually set the 
# IP/netmask on the bridge interface, here we 
# assume 10.8.0.4/255.255.255.0.  Finally we 
# must set aside an IP range in this subnet 
# (start=10.8.0.50 end=10.8.0.100) to allocate 
# to connecting clients.  Leave this line commented 
# out unless you are ethernet bridging. 
;server-bridge 10.8.0.4 255.255.255.0 10.8.0.50  
10.8.0.100 
# Configure server mode for ethernet bridging 
# using a DHCP-proxy, where clients talk 
# to the OpenVPN server-side DHCP server 
# to receive their IP address allocation 
# and DNS server addresses.  You must first use 
# your OS's bridging capability to bridge the TAP 
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# interface with the ethernet NIC interface. 
# Note: this mode only works on clients (such as 
# Windows), where the client-side TAP adapter is 
# bound to a DHCP client. 
;server-bridge 
# Push routes to the client to allow it 
# to reach other private subnets behind 
# the server.  Remember that these 
# private subnets will also need 
# to know to route the OpenVPN client 
# address pool (10.8.0.0/255.255.255.0) 
# back to the OpenVPN server. 
;push "route 10.80.0.0 255.255.252.0" 
;push "route 192.168.20.0 255.255.255.0" 
# To assign specific IP addresses to specific 
# clients or if a connecting client has a private 
# subnet behind it that should also have VPN access, 
# use the subdirectory "ccd" for client-specific 
# configuration files (see man page for more info). 
# EXAMPLE: Suppose the client 
# having the certificate common name "Thelonious" 
# also has a small subnet behind his connecting 
# machine, such as 192.168.40.128/255.255.255.248. 
# First, uncomment out these lines: 
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;client-config-dir ccd 
;route 192.168.40.128 255.255.255.248 
# Then create a file ccd/Thelonious with this line: 
#   iroute 192.168.40.128 255.255.255.248 
# This will allow Thelonious' private subnet to 
# access the VPN.  This example will only work 
# if you are routing, not bridging, i.e. you are 
# using "dev tun" and "server" directives. 
# EXAMPLE: Suppose you want to give 
# Thelonious a fixed VPN IP address of 10.9.0.1. 
# First uncomment out these lines: 
;client-config-dir ccd 
;route 10.9.0.0 255.255.255.252 
# Then add this line to ccd/Thelonious: 
#   ifconfig-push 10.9.0.1 10.9.0.2 
# Suppose that you want to enable different 
# firewall access policies for different groups 
# of clients.  There are two methods: 
# (1) Run multiple OpenVPN daemons, one for each 
#     group, and firewall the TUN/TAP interface 
#     for each group/daemon appropriately. 
# (2) (Advanced) Create a script to dynamically 
#     modify the firewall in response to access 
#     from different clients.  See man 
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#     page for more info on learn-address script. 
;learn-address ./script 
# If enabled, this directive will configure 
# all clients to redirect their default 
# network gateway through the VPN, causing 
# all IP traffic such as web browsing and 
# and DNS lookups to go through the VPN 
# (The OpenVPN server machine may need to NAT 
# or bridge the TUN/TAP interface to the internet 
# in order for this to work properly). 
;push "redirect-gateway def1 bypass-dhcp" 
# Certain Windows-specific network settings 
# can be pushed to clients, such as DNS 
# or WINS server addresses.  CAVEAT: 
# http://openvpn.net/faq.html#dhcpcaveats 
# The addresses below refer to the public 
# DNS servers provided by opendns.com. 
;push "dhcp-option DNS 208.67.222.222" 
;push "dhcp-option DNS 208.67.220.220" 
# Uncomment this directive to allow different 
# clients to be able to "see" each other. 
# By default, clients will only see the server. 
# To force clients to only see the server, you 
# will also need to appropriately firewall the 
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# server's TUN/TAP interface. 
client-to-client 
# Uncomment this directive if multiple clients 
# might connect with the same certificate/key 
# files or common names.  This is recommended 
# only for testing purposes.  For production use, 
# each client should have its own certificate/key 
# pair. 
# IF YOU HAVE NOT GENERATED INDIVIDUAL 
# CERTIFICATE/KEY PAIRS FOR EACH CLIENT, 
# EACH HAVING ITS OWN UNIQUE "COMMON NAME", 
# UNCOMMENT THIS LINE OUT. 
;duplicate-cn 
# The keepalive directive causes ping-like 
# messages to be sent back and forth over 
# the link so that each side knows when 
# the other side has gone down. 
# Ping every 10 seconds, assume that remote 
# peer is down if no ping received during 
# a 120 second time period. 
keepalive 10 120 
# For extra security beyond that provided 
# by SSL/TLS, create an "HMAC firewall" 
# to help block DoS attacks and UDP port flooding. 
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# Generate with: 
#   openvpn --genkey --secret ta.key 
# The server and each client must have 
# a copy of this key. 
# The second parameter should be '0' 
# on the server and '1' on the clients. 
;tls-auth ta.key 0 # This file is secret 
# Select a cryptographic cipher. 
# This config item must be copied to 
# the client config file as well. 
;cipher BF-CBC        # Blowfish (default) 
;cipher AES-128-CBC   # AES 
;cipher DES-EDE3-CBC  # Triple-DES 
# Enable compression on the VPN link. 
# If you enable it here, you must also 
# enable it in the client config file. 
comp-lzo 
# The maximum number of concurrently connected 
# clients we want to allow. 
;max-clients 100 
# It's a good idea to reduce the OpenVPN 
# daemon's privileges after initialization. 
# You can uncomment this out on 




# The persist options will try to avoid 
# accessing certain resources on restart 
# that may no longer be accessible because 
# of the privilege downgrade. 
persist-key 
persist-tun 
# Output a short status file showing 
# current connections, truncated 
# and rewritten every minute. 
status openvpn-status.log 
# By default, log messages will go to the syslog (or 
# on Windows, if running as a service, they will go to 
# the "\Program Files\OpenVPN\log" directory). 
# Use log or log-append to override this default. 
# "log" will truncate the log file on OpenVPN startup, 
# while "log-append" will append to it.  Use one 
# or the other (but not both). 
;log         openvpn.log 
;log-append  openvpn.log 
# Set the appropriate level of log 
# file verbosity. 
# 0 is silent, except for fatal errors 
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# 4 is reasonable for general usage 
# 5 and 6 can help to debug connection problems 
# 9 is extremely verbose 
verb 3 
# Silence repeating messages.  At most 20 
# sequential messages of the same message 
# category will be output to the log. 
;mute 20 
B. CLIENT CONFIGURATION FILE 
############################################## 
# Sample client-side OpenVPN 2.0 config file # 
# for connecting to multi-client server.     # 
#                                            # 
# This configuration can be used by multiple # 
# clients, however each client should have   # 
# its own cert and key files.                # 
#                                            # 
# On Windows, you might want to rename this  # 
# file so it has a .ovpn extension           # 
############################################## 
# Specify that we are a client and that we 
# will be pulling certain config file directives 
# from the server. 
client 
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remote cstgn.dyndns.org 1194 
# Use the same setting as you are using on 
# the server. 
# On most systems, the VPN will not function 
# unless you partially or fully disable 





# Windows needs the TAP-Win32 adapter name 
# from the Network Connections panel 
# if you have more than one.  On XP SP2, 
# you may need to disable the firewall 
# for the TAP adapter. 
;dev-node MyTap 
#remote cstgn.dyndns.org 1194 
route 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 
; route 10.8.0.0 255.255.252.0 
# Are we connecting to a TCP or 
# UDP server?  Use the same setting as 




# The hostname/IP and port of the server. 
# You can have multiple remote entries 
# to load balance between the servers. 
;remote 10.80.0.1 1194 
# remote 192.168.1.109 1194 
# Choose a random host from the remote 
# list for load-balancing.  Otherwise 
# try hosts in the order specified. 
remote-random 
# Keep trying indefinitely to resolve the 
# host name of the OpenVPN server.  Very useful 
# on machines which are not permanently connected 
# to the internet such as laptops. 
resolv-retry infinite 
# Most clients don't need to bind to 
# a specific local port number. 
nobind 








# If you are connecting through an 
# HTTP proxy to reach the actual OpenVPN 
# server, put the proxy server/IP and 
# port number here.  See the man page 
# if your proxy server requires 
# authentication. 
;http-proxy-retry # retry on connection failures 
;http-proxy [proxy server] [proxy port #] 
# Wireless networks often produce a lot 
# of duplicate packets.  Set this flag 
# to silence duplicate packet warnings. 
#mute-replay-warnings 
# SSL/TLS parms. 
# See the server config file for more 
# description.  It's best to use 
# a separate .crt/.key file pair 
# for each client.  A single ca 





# Verify server certificate by checking 
# that the certicate has the nsCertType 
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# field set to "server".  This is an 
# important precaution to protect against 
# a potential attack discussed here: 
#  http://openvpn.net/howto.html#mitm 
# To use this feature, you will need to generate 
# your server certificates with the nsCertType 
# field set to "server".  The build-key-server 
# script in the easy-rsa folder will do this. 
;ns-cert-type server 
# If a tls-auth key is used on the server 
# then every client must also have the key. 
;tls-auth ta.key 1 
# Select a cryptographic cipher. 
# If the cipher option is used on the server 
# then you must also specify it here. 
;cipher x 
# Enable compression on the VPN link. 
# Don't enable this unless it is also 
# enabled in the server config file. 
comp-lzo 
# Set log file verbosity. 
verb 3 
# Silence repeating messages 
;mute 20 
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